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I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic communication, "e-mail," is wonderful. It provides fast,
efficient, inexpensive, seemingly instant communication. No more tel-
ephone tag. No more overnighting documents via expensive messen-
ger services. No wonder the use of e-mail is burgeoning. Even the
most computer-phobic lawyers have embraced it.
Articles in newspapers and professional journals have alerted law-
yers to the possibility that the absolute confidentiality of unencrypted
e-mail traveling across the Internet cannot be assured. Concerns re-
garding the possibility that using e-mail may, in some circumstances,
effectively waive the attorney-client privilege1 have led several states
to adopt legislation providing that the use of e-mail, in and of itself,
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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does not destroy the attorney-client privilege. 2 Some state ethics com-
mittees have taken the position that, because of the possibility of in-
terception, e-mail should not be used for attorney-client
communication unless the messages are encrypted or the client has
been made aware of the risk and consented to use of the "insecure"
communication. 3 Other state ethics committees have taken the posi-
tion that use of e-mail is no more subject to interception than is a tele-
phone conversation, and therefore, there is a reasonable expectation
that e-mail will remain private, making use of unencrypted e-mail
across the Internet ethically acceptable. 4
E-mail has been likened to cellular telephones,5 landline tele-
phones, 6 and use of postcards through the United States Postal Ser-
vice.7 At least one court (in considering the nature of unencrypted
Internet transmission of sexually explicit materials) has recognized
that it is not appropriate to consider e-mail to be a "sealed" mode of
transmission.8 The court, however, suggested that cautionary lan-
2. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4547 (McKinney Supp. 1990) (codifying for purposes of the
rules of evidence that electronic communication, in itself, does not render privi-
leged communication non-privileged). California considered, but did not adopt,
similar legislation, whether because it was deemed unnecessary, or because e-
mail is deemed by that legislature too insecure to place beyond challenge or for
other reasons is not clear.
3. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op. 96-01 (1996) [here-
inafter Iowa Ethics Op. 96-01] (warning that the failure to obtain written consent
for internet communications or to protect the transmissions with encryption
would result in a violation of IowA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR
LAWYERs DR 4-101); see also Arizona State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, Op. 97-04 (1997) [hereinafter Ariz. Ethics Op. 97-04] (recom-
mending that lawyers use encryption or warn clients of the risks associated with
e-mail). The Iowa opinion was later amended to allow counsel and client to agree
on the type of protection afforded their communications. See Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of
Professional Ethics and Conduct, Op. 97-01 (1997) [hereinafter Iowa Ethics Op.
97-01].
4. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Advisory
Op. 96-10 (1997) [hereinafter Ill. Ethics Op. 96-10].
5. See id.; New York State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 709 (Sep-
tember, 1998) [hereinafter N.Y. Ethics Op. 7091.
6. See Todd H. Flaming, Internet E-Mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 85 ILL.
B.J. 183 (1997).
7. See, e.g., William Freivogel, Communicating with or About Clients on the In-
ternet: Legal, Ethical, and Liability Concerns, 17 ALAS Loss PREVENTION J. 17,
18 (1996) (noting that technical articles frequently liken Internet messages to
postcards, leading legal writers to conclude that "Itihere is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy"). Freivogel, however, disagrees with this analogy: "It is impor-
tant to remember that the hacker's activity is as criminal as the wiretappers."
Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). The majority of states allow lawyers to trans-
mit confidential information without encryption. See ALAS Loss PREvENTION
BULL., No. 98-27 (October 19, 1998). But see Richard E.V. Harris, Electronic
Communications and the Law of Privilege, 11 CAL. LITIG. 14 (1997).




guage similar to that commonly used on facsimile transmissions
might be sufficient protection, 9 thus analogizing e-mail to those trans-
missions. The absence of uniformity indicates that none of these anal-
yses is sufficiently persuasive to be regarded as definitive.
As a result, state bar associations, ethics committees, and commen-
tators have taken positions ranging from (i) e-mail is not so insecure
as to constitute failure to protect client confidentiality obligations, to
(ii) e-mail, at least unencrypted e-mail traveling across the Internet, is
that insecure, and therefore use of unencrypted e-mail traveling
across the Internet may, in some cases, risk both a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege and a breach of the lawyer's ethical obligations to
protect clients' confidential information.
II. THE ISSUE
The central issue is: What are the legal, ethical and practical con-
siderations involved in utilizing e-mail for attorney-client commnmica-
tion? Subsidiary issues include: Will the use of e-mail, in and of itself,
risk forfeiting the attorney-client privilege in connection with a de-
mand for discovery, on the ground that communication across the In-
ternet via e-mail has been likened to sending a postcard through the
mail, and using a postcard to communicate information may be seen
as indicating that the information is not regarded by the sender as
confidential? Even if the attorney-client privilege is not at risk, will
an attorney using unencrypted e-mail be vulnerable to accusations of
unethical practice for failure to protect a client's confidences? Is the
use of e-mail, even if not unethical or a risk to the attorney-client priv-
ilege, unwise because there is a high risk of unintended disclosure
with resulting damage to the attorney-client relationship?
III. AUTHOR'S SUMMARY
The author believes that the use of e-mail, in and of itself, should
not waive the attorney-client or work-product privileges and should
not, in and of itself, subject an attorney to liability for ethical viola-
tions or claims of unethical behavior based on a failure to adequately
protect client confidences.
On the other hand, lawyers, and their clients, need to consider the
fact that e-mail is a unique form of communication. E-mail feels like a
telephone conversation, but technically, it is quite different, and pro-
duces a document that is likely to be casually worded and long-lived.
Accordingly, attorneys and their clients are well advised to become
familiar with their e-mail systems and to develop policies and proce-
9. See id. at 844-45.
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dures designed to assure maximally-effective use and minimize the
risk of unintended and inappropriate disclosure.
For purposes of analyzing whether attorney-client privilege is at
risk, the key issue is whether, in communicating by e-mail, an attor-
ney and client have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Because the
factual situations and contexts in which e-mail is used vary widely,
whether particular arrangements provide a "reasonable expectation of
privacy," and thus conform to the evidentiary standard required in
connection with asserting attorney-client privilege, is likely to be a
question of fact.
Whether there is a sufficient "reasonable expectation of privacy" to
support an assertion of the attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges, which are rules of evidence, is separate from the issues relating
to whether use of unencrypted e-mail raises ethical issues regarding
potential failure to treat confidential client communications as confi-
dential. In order to emphasize that distinction and separate facts,
case law, and theoretical discussion, this article is divided into five
sections: Factual Background; Case Law Regarding the Attorney-Cli-
ent and the Related Attorney Work-Product Privileges; a Summary of
State Ethical Opinions Regarding Use of E-mail; Risks; and
Recommendations.
IV. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Law firms are installing a variety of internal systems that permit
lawyers to communicate with one another: some permit communica-
tion within a single office, some permit communication among re-
gional offices, and some permit communication with one or more
offices from outside the system. Corporations are also installing inter-
nal systems that permit lawyers to communicate with one another
and with their corporate clients: again, within the corporate head-
quarters, from outlying locations, and from outside the internal sys-
tem. Law firms are connecting electronically with their clients.
Sometimes these are via direct, dedicated connections. Sometimes
they permit clients to have limited access to a firm's internal system.
Sometimes these arrangements give outside counsel access to the cor-
porate client's system. Access, when given, may be provided in vari-
ous ways. For example, access may be provided by an outside
provider, such as AT&T or America Online, as a means of exchanging
e-mail. These arrangements, in turn, may vary. For example, such e-
mail may be exchanged either through the provider's general system
or within a special, dedicated area of the system with limited access.
Where attorney and client use different e-mail providers, the e-mail
may move directly between providers, or, in order to move from one
provider to another, may move across the Internet.
1999]
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Some firms have systems that automatically encrypt all messages
exchanged within the system and between the system and the outside
world, in some cases without its users being aware of the encryption
process. Some firms require passwords or other identification and au-
thentication procedures before a message is sent or received. Some
organizations have e-mail policies that set forth practices and proce-
dures for using e-mail, including for what purposes it may and may
not be used; others have no policies, procedures or limitations on the
use of e-mail by employees, agents or others, including their lawyers.
E-mail on an internal "intranet" system may or may not be en-
crypted, and may be read by the system administrator (or not, if it is
encrypted), depending upon the system and how it is configured and
used. The variations among systems are even more diverse. Commu-
nication on a private intranet is likely to go straight to the organiza-
tion's e-mail server and remain there until retrieved. Communication
within a given service provider is likely to go to the service provider's
server and remain there until retrieved. Communication from one
service provider to another is likely to travel across the Internet, a
process which may involve passing the message from server to server,
across a varying number of servers and via a route that cannot be
predetermined.
Simply stated, all e-mail is not created equal.
Where e-mail moves via a direct connection from the sender's to
the receiver's system, for example, via modem to modem, the connec-
tion is, like a telephone call, simultaneous. Where, however, e-mail
communication is across the Internet, the communication is made via
a series of relays, that is, a "connectionless" system, and thus techni-
cally different from a telephone call or a facsimile connection.
The Internet can be envisioned as a huge number of computer sys-
tems linked together, some of which are set up to send and receive e-
mail. (A system for this conceptual purpose may be of any size, from a
small desktop computer to a large mainframe.) Each system set up to
send and receive e-mail is able and willing to send and receive
messages directed to anyone, to sort the messages and keep those ad-
dressed to it, and to pass on those messages addressed to other
systems.
The Internet was originally designed by the United States Depart-
ment of Defense, with the objective of assuring that messages reach
their destinations somehow, even if parts of the Internet were cut off.
Thus, the specific route, or even most likely route, of a particular
message is never known with certainty in advance. It may be deter-
mined in retrospect, however. At the beginning of many e-mail
messages that have traveled across the Internet is a list of addresses,
generally unfamiliar to the final addressee. These are the addresses
of the systems through which the message has passed en route to the
[Vol. 78:386
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addressee. Long messages may be broken into "packets" which are
reassembled at each intermediate system through which the message
passes as well as at their final destination.
It is worth noting that the Department of Defense did not envision
sending confidential information unencrypted. It had, and continues
to have, different levels of encryption (and alternative communication
channels), and depending upon its own set of classifications, it sends
messages at whatever level of encryption is determined to be appropri-
ate for the information involved. The more secret the information, the
more complex the encryption code, and the longer the time required to
encrypt and decrypt the message.
Each system that participates in the Internet has at least one sys-
tem administrator. That person, in order to keep the system operat-
ing efficiently, may, like the system administrator of a commercial
system, review messages on the system to assure the system's orderly
functioning.1 0 This review process by system administrators is not
"interception" or "hacking." There is nothing illegal or improper in the
owner of a computer system reviewing messages on the system.
Where messages travel across the Internet, there may or may not be
any contractual relationship (e.g., such as might be established be-
tween an e-mail user and a commercial service) between sender or re-
ceiver and these system owners requiring that confidentiality be
maintained. There are statutory obligations of confidentiality im-
posed on commercial system administrators. These may or may not
apply to unrelated non-commercial system administrators. Note,
however, that obligations of confidentiality do not mean that such sys-
tem administrators cannot see e-mail on their systems, but only that
they have an obligation not to disclose the information to third par-
ties, or to use the information for their personal benefit."i In fact, it is
10. Note that this review does not require "opening" messages. Unlike letters placed
in envelopes, which must be opened to be read, to a system administrator, e-mail
messages appear immediately following their address blocks, and are followed by
the address block of the next message. Unlike the addressee, who generally sees
a list of messages identified by sender and subject, the system administrator sees
a continuous text that does not separate addresses from text.
11. See discussion infra Part VIII (Risk 1). The imposition of confidentiality obliga-
tions on non-commercial system administrators may raise a variety of issues re-
lating to whether they will know the information is confidential, and whether, in
some circumstances, they may have a duty to disclose or investigate, as for exam-
ple if they come across e-mail indicating that a crime threatening death or seri-
ous bodily harm is about to be committed. See generally CLIFFORD STOLL, THE
CucKoo's EGG: TRACiNoG A Spy THROUGH THE MAZE OF COMPUTER EsPIONAGE
(1989) (an account of a student system administrator who concluded he did have
an obligation, as an administrator and citizen, to report a billing discrepancy in a
university system. Exploration of the discrepancy uncovered unauthorized, Ger-




clear that system administrators will, under appropriate circum-
stances, have legal access to confidential messages passing through
the service provider's system. Therefore, disclosure of confidential in-
formation is a risk even when a third party administrator's obligations
of maintaining its confidentiality may mean that the attorney-client
privilege has not been jeopardized.
V. CASE LAW REGARDING THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND
RELATED ATTORNEY WORK-PRODUCT PRIVILEGES
The attorney-client privilege is a rule of evidence that prohibits ac-
cess by third parties to certain communications between attorney and
client. It is generally cited in support of the asserting party's refusal
to provide information or materials sought by the opposing party in
the course of litigation.1 2 Similarly, the related work-product privi-
lege prohibits access by third parties to certain kinds of information
created by an attorney, (and sometimes among attorneys), in connec-
tion with a particular matter in litigation. Because these communica-
tions are generally highly reliable and of great interest to opposing
counsel and the trier of fact (judge or jury), in order to assert these
privileges, there are stringent requirements as to how comimunica-
tions and other materials sought to be protected by these privileges
must be handled. In general, failure to treat information sought to be
protected by the attorney-client or work-product privilege as "confi-
dential" risks waiving the privilege.13
Simply designating information as "privileged and confidential"
does not, merely by virtue of such designation, entitle it to the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege, even when the information is di-
rected to or comes from an attorney (whether in-house or outside
counsel). Certain standards must be met. Various courts have enun-
ciated these in various ways. The touchstones of maintaining the at-
torney-client privilege may be summarized as follows: (i) legal advice
which is sought from a lawyer, in his or her capacity as such, and (ii)
the communications relating to that purpose are made in confidence
by the client and at its insistence permanently protected from disclo-
sure by the client or the legal advisor.14 In addition, for a corporation
to assert the attorney-client privilege, the corporation must be able to
show that: (i) the information was disclosed by a corporate employee
12. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged .... ."); FED. R. EVID. 501 ("[Ihe privilege of a witness... shall be
governed by the principles of the common law .... ").
13. See 8 JoiN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2311 (John
T. McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
14. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 318-19 (7th Cir.
1963) (citing 8 WIGMORE, supra note 13, §§ 2285, 2292); see also 8 WIGMORE,
supra note 13, § 2321.
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acting within the scope of the employee's corporate duties, (ii) the em-
ployee was seeking legal advice from counsel, (iii) the information was
considered confidential when made available, and (iv) its confidential-
ity has been maintained.' 5
Maintaining confidentiality within a corporation requires that
communication of the privileged information be limited to those em-
ployees and agents of the corporation who have a need to know it.16 If
the information becomes generally available, (within the corporation),
it is regarded as not being treated as confidential information and, at
least arguably, the privilege may have been waived.' 7
The related work-product privilege permits withholding certain in-
formation from discovery to prevent invasion of the privacy of an at-
torney's trial preparation.1 8 Like attorney-client privileged materials,
work-product materials must be treated as confidential, although the
scope of people to whom these materials may be disclosed may be
broader than the disclosure permitted in connection with maintaining
the attorney-client privilege.1 9
The attorney-client privilege is absolute although the client may
waive it. Waiver may also occur (in fact, may be most likely to occur)
inadvertently. Where the client does not continue to treat information
as confidential, the attorney-client privilege may be lost. For example,
such loss may occur when attorney-client privileged information is
discussed with employees of a corporation who attend a meeting (and
by analogy, receive documents or participate in e-mail discussions)
outside the scope of their duties to the corporation. 20 During the
course of litigation, counsel may, for example, argue that the use of e-
mail involved the risk of interception and the possibility of disclosure
to a third party, such as a third party system administrator, or that e-
mail messages were sent to a wider group of employees than those
who had a need to know. Either argument could be used to support
the proposition that the information sent via e-mail was not handled
as confidential, and, therefore, the attorney-client and work-product
privileges had been waived. The author believes that such an argu-
15. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-95 (1981).
16. See id. at 395.
17. See id. at 391-95.
18. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947), in which the court held that
"memoranda, statements and mental impressions" fell outside the attorney-client
privilege. The Court nevertheless determined them to be worthy of protection
from discovery by opposing counsel. See id. at 512-13. To meet this perceived
need for protection from discovery, the Hickman Court established a "work-prod-
uct" privilege. See id. at 511 (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d
Cir. 1945)).
19. See, e.g., Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1978)
(en banc).
20. See, e.g., Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394.
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ment, relating to application of the rules of evidence, should not pre-
vail, and several states, including New York, have adopted legislation
to the effect that merely transmitting e-mail across the Internet will
not, in and of itself, waive the attorney-client privilege for purposes of
the rules of evidence. 2 1 The fact that such legislation was deemed
needed, or at least advisable, however, indicates that in the absence of
such legislation, there is a risk that the attorney-client or work-prod-
uct privilege might be lost simply by using unencrypted e-mail to com-
municate information otherwise protected by these privileges.
VI. SUMMARY OF ETHICS COMMITTEE OPINIONS
REGARDING E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS
The risk of actual loss of confidentiality is a separate issue from the
ability to secure the protection of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges under the rules of evidence. 22 Under Model Rule 1.6, a law-
yer has an ethical obligation to "hold inviolate" confidential informa-
tion of the client.23 Initially, different states took inconsistent
positions regarding whether the use of unencrypted e-mail constitutes
a breach of a lawyer's ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality
regarding a client's confidential information or a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege on the grounds that by using e-mail, information
was not being handled in the requisite confidential manner.
Focusing on the possibility of interception of e-mail, the Ethics
Committee of the Illinois Bar Association (and those following its rea-
soning) came to the opposite conclusion from the Ethics Committee of
the Iowa Bar. Iowa concluded that because it is possible for e-mail
messages to be intercepted, lawyers should not use e-mail for sensitive
communications unless the messages are encrypted or the client has
consented to the "non-secure" communication. 2 4 Iowa initially deter-
mined that encryption would be adequate protection, 2 5 but after issu-
ing its original opinion, the board reconsidered, and concluded that
21. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
22. Disclosure to a company's system administrator is similar to disclosure to a secre-
tary, and thus should not waive the privilege. When, however, messages are sent
across the Internet, system administrators outside the sending or receiving or-
ganization, and their respective service providers, may have legal access to these
messages because e-mail may be relayed through third parties' systems. Note
that e-mail seen by system administrators is continuous. Each message immedi-
ately follows the address and is immediately followed by the address of the fol-
lowing message. Thus, a system administrator reviewing e-mail in the ordinary
course of system administration (for example, to determine why response time
had become unusually slow) would routinely see both the address and the
message. Encryption would conceal the sense of the message, but indicate its
length.
23. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6, n.2 (1999).
24. See Iowa Ethics Op. 96-01, supra note 3.
25. See id.
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the means of protection should be determined by mutual agreement
between the lawyer and client. 26 Arizona's ethics committee also fo-
cused on the question of interception, but took a more cautious ap-
proach, initially concluding that the answer to whether a lawyer
"should" communicate with clients via unencrypted e-mail was
"[m]aybe." 2 7 The committee concluded that a lawyer "may" communi-
cate with a client via unencrypted e-mail without sacrificing the attor-
ney-client privilege, but that it was "preferable," if "practical," to use
encryption software or a password to protect the communication. 28
Illinois came to the conclusion that one has a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy when sending unencrypted e-mail over the Internet,
and its reasoning has subsequently been followed by several other
states, including South Carolina, Vermont, North Dakota and Ken-
tucky. In its analysis, Illinois focused on the fact that a particular e-
mail message was unlikely to be "intercepted" when traveling across
the Internet and noted that the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act2 9 made it a crime to intercept an e-mail message. Based on these
facts, Illinois concluded that such interception was no more likely
than interception of a telephone conversation and therefore, that there
was a reasonable expectation of privacy in using e-mail across the In-
ternet and encryption was not necessary either to meet ethical obliga-
tions of confidentiality or to protect the confidentiality of sensitive
information. 30
VII. CASE LAW REGARDING USE OF E-MAIL
Research reveals no cases holding that use of e-mail waived the
attorney-client privilege, no cases holding that use of e-mail waived
work-product immunity, and no cases finding that use of e-mail for
attorney-client communications was unethical.
Research also revealed no cases deciding whether: (a) the intercep-
tion of confidential information sent by e-mail waives the attorney-
26. See Iowa Ethics Op. 97-01, supra note 3.
27. Using a question and answer format for its opinion, in response to the question,
"Should lawyers communicate with existing clients, via e-mail, about confidential
matters?," Arizona answers, "Maybe," and suggests, "Lawyers may want to have
the e-mail encrypted with a password .... Alternatively, there is encryption
software available .... " Ariz. Ethics Op., supra note 3, at 5.
28. The Arizona Committee concluded that although it is not unethical for a lawyer
to use e-mail to communicate with clients, it supported encryption: "this Commit-
tee simply suggests that it is preferable to protect attorney/client communication
to the extent it is practical." Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994).
30. See Ill. Ethics Op. 96-10, supra note 4; see also N.Y. Ethics Op. 709, supra note 5;
North Dakota State Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Op. 97-09 (1997) [hereinafter N.D.
Ethics Op. 97-09]; South Carolina Bar, Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 97-08 (1997)
[hereinafter S.C. Ethics Op. 97-08]; Vermont Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional
Responsibility, Op. 97-5 (1998) [hereinafter Vermont Ethics Op. 97-5].
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client privilege or breaches the attorney's obligations of confidential-
ity, (b) the monitoring of e-mail containing confidential information by
a third party system administrator, who has no (contractual) obliga-
tions of confidentiality to the attorney or the client, waives the attor-
ney-client privilege or breaches the attorney's obligations of
confidentiality, or (c) the use of e-mail breaches an attorney's obliga-
tions of confidentiality regarding client confidences so as to form a ba-
sis for a successful malpractice suit.
There is case law indicating that a "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" in an e-mail transmission depends upon the specific technology
and factual situation involved, and finding a reasonable expectation of
privacy when the e-mail is sent between persons subscribing to the
same commercial provider.31 There is also case law stating that
messages sent across the Internet are not "sealed."32
These cases, and the general dearth of cases dealing with sending
unencrypted e-mail across the Internet, have led to uncertainty as to
whether a court would find a reasonable expectation of privacy con-
cerning such communications. As a result, some commentators have
warned that "current statutes and case law are inadequate to provide
the expectation of privacy necessary to invoke the protection of the
attorney-client privilege" when unencrypted e-mail is sent across the
Internet,3 3 while others have asserted that unencrypted e-mail com-
munications should be considered privileged. 34
It is worth noting that the reasonable expectation of privacy is not,
in and of itself, a function of either statutes or case law, but rather, of
the application of overarching legal principles and public policy to an
entire set of factual circumstances in each particular case. Neverthe-
less, the mere fact that there is currently a body of commentary warn-
ing of the absence of existing law to provide a foundation for a
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding these communications
31. See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568, 576 (U.S_.F. Crim. App. 1995) (find-
ing that defendant transmitting pornographic materials via e-mail from a pro-
vider within the same private on-line computer service as that used by the
receiver, and requiring passwords for access, had a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy), rev'd in part on other grounds, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.kF. 1996). Maxwell was a
Fourth Amendment search and seizure case, and did not involve transmissions
relayed across the Internet through multiple service providers. Its applicability
to transmissions across the Internet is questionable.
32. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,834 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 884
(1997).
33. See William P. Matthews, Encoded Confidences: Electronic Mail, The Internet,
and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 273, 299 (1996); see also
Charles R. Merrill, E-mail for Attorneys from A to Z, 443 PLI/PATrErs 187 (Dec.
1996); Peter R. Jarvis & Bradley F. Tellam, The Internet: New Dangers of Ethics
Traps, OR. ST. B. BULL., Dec. 1995, at 17, 17.
34. See, e.g., Morgan Chu & Perry Goldberg, E-Mail and the Attorney-Client Privilege
in California, CAL. LrrIG., Fall 1997, at 18, 23.
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has created a sense of unease regarding the use of e-mail for privi-
leged and confidential communications. As indicated, even some eth-
ics committees and commentators who do not believe that sending
unencrypted e-mail messages across the Internet forfeits the attorney-
client privilege nevertheless emphasize the potential risks of un-
wanted disclosure of sensitive information and recommend various
protective measures, from warning language similar to that typically
included on the cover pages of messages sent by facsimile, to the use of
encryption. Some commentators have mentioned the possibility of ex-
posure to a malpractice suit if the risk of inadvertent or unintended
disclosure becomes reality.3 5 These discussions are often character-
ized by uncertainty and ambivalence. 36
VIII. THE RISKS
Clearly, there are risks, among them, the following:
Risk #1: A court will find that the mere use of unencrypted e-mail
across the Internet to communicate otherwise privileged information
constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client or work-product privilege.
A court might conclude that mere use of unencrypted e-mail across
the Internet waived the attorney-client or work-product privilege on
several grounds. First, under appropriate circumstances, a court
might accept an argument that both sender and receiver knew, or
should have known, that unencrypted e-mail traveling within an in-
tra-firm system is read by people who have no "need to know" or that
e-mail traveling across the Internet may be read by third party system
administrators. Thus, because the use of e-mail involved the possibil-
ity of disclosure to such a third party, or because the e-mail messages
were sent to a wider group of employees than those who had a need to
know, the attorney-client and work-product privileges would be
deemed to have been waived. The author believes that such an argu-
ment relating to internal distribution may prevail if internal policies
disregarded obligations to limit distribution. Such obligations, how-
ever, apply to "hard" copy as well as e-mail. The primary difference is
the ease with which e-mail is widely distributed.
35. See Jarvis & Tellam, supra note 33, at 17.
36. The ambivalence is illustrated by a reported e-mail interview, in which the com-
mentator stated that he did not believe use of unencrypted e-mail exposed a law-
yer to charges of acting unethically, but that using it was "unconscionably poor
judgment." It appears that such a position is untenable. At least arguably, exer-
cise of "unconscionably poor judgment" is, or should be, a breach of ethics. At a
minimum, "unconscionably poor judgment" is likely to provide a basis for a cli-
ent's termination of an attorney-client relationship, even if not a successful mal-
practice suit. See Jerry Lawson, An Encryption Primer for Attorneys, in LAwrsRS
ON Lm'E: A GUIDE TO Usmo =rH INERNET VI-7 (1995).
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With regard to sending unencrypted e-mail across the Internet, the
author believes that merely communicating through unencrypted e-
mail should not waive the attorney-client or work-product privileges.
Several states, including New York, have adopted legislation to this
effect for purposes of the rules of evidence,3 7 but the legislation pro-
vides both comfort and a warning. The fact that such legislation ex-
ists indicates that at least some legislatures believe that inadvertent
waiver should not be inferred from use of unencrypted e-mail. On the
other hand, the fact that such legislation was deemed needed, or at
least advisable, indicates that in the absence of such legislation, there
is a risk, or at least a perceived risk, that the attorney-client or work-
product privilege might be lost simply by using e-mail to communicate
information otherwise protected by these privileges.
A court might also choose to analyze a particular fact situation by
analogizing e-mail to a telephone conversation. If, however, the court
focuses on the technical differences between telephone calls and e-
mail sent across the Internet, it might conclude there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy when sending unencrypted e-mail across the In-
ternet. Although some state ethics committees (following the Illinois'
Ethics Committee) have found that these technical differences do not
pose any significant threat to privacy, a careful analysis of that rea-
soning might ultimately lead a court to reject it.
The analysis might develop as follows: Illinois, and the states that
follow its reasoning, rely heavily on the fact that "[interception or
monitoring of e-mail for purposes other than assuring quality of ser-
vice or maintenance is illegal under the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act . ... "38 But interception of an electronic communication,
as defined by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA")
relates only to messages moving across the Internet.39 Once messages
are "delivered" (and delivery may be to servers en route as well as to
the final addressee), they are "stored" on a server, and reading them
while they are stored on a server does not constitute interception.40
In addition, the ECPA arguably regulates only "provider[s] of wire or
37. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
38. S.C. Ethics Op. 97-08, supra note 30; see also Ill. Ethics Op. 96-10, supra note 4;
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1994). Vermont and North Dakota have also concluded
that the use of unencrypted e-mail does not violate obligations to treat communi-
cations with clients as confidential. See N.D. Ethics Op. 97-09, supra note 30;
Vermont Ethics Op. 97-5, supra note 30.
39. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 & 2511(1)(a) (1994).
40. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62
(5th Cir. 1994). The decision has its critics. See, e.g., David Hricik, Lawyers
Worry Too Much About Transmitting Client Confidences by Internet E-mail, GEo.
J. LEGAL ETHIcS 459, 474-76 (1998). The analysis is based in part on the belief
that messages broken into packets are reassembled only at their final destina-
tion. In fact, they are reassembled at each server en route to their destination.
See Jonathan B. Postel, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, RFC 821 (Aug. 1982) (vis-
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electronic communication service[s], whose facilities are used in the
transmission of a wire or electronic communication,"41 and there is a
risk that the reference will be construed to refer only to commercial
providers.
If the reference is so construed and limited, messages passed
through the systems of organizations which are at best only inciden-
tally "providers" of electronic communications services (for example,
universities and large corporations) may not be protected by any of the
obligations imposed by the ECPA, including any obligations of confi-
dentiality. (Since the ECPA also provides certain protections to those
it covers, imposing confidentiality obligations on system administra-
tors of non-commercial third party systems might also entail ex-
tending the protections of the ECPA to these entities, which a court
might be reluctant to do in the absence of clear legislative direction on
the issue.) Even if confidentiality obligations are imposed on private
parties, if a court were to view unencrypted e-mail moving across the
Internet as more like a postcard than a letter in a sealed a envelope, a
confidentiality obligation similar to that imposed upon United States
Postal employees might not be sufficient to eliminate the risk of loss of
confidentiality for purposes of the attorney-client and work-product
privileges.
In any event, the risk of actual disclosure remains. As indicated
above, computer systems of all sizes, from a single desktop computer
to large mainframes, have at least one system administrator whose
job is to assure that the system operates smoothly. A system adminis-
trator for an organization's e-mail system does not, in the normal
course, have a "need to know" attorney-client privileged information,
but may, in connection with managing the company's computer sys-
tem, have a need to access all the information on the system, including
unencrypted e-mail. As indicated above, review by an organization's
system administrator appears to be similar to review by a secretary of
documents typed for a lawyer, and should not waive the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. Where, however, the review may in fact be made by an
unaffiliated third party system administrator, and particularly where
it is in fact so made, there is a risk that a court would conclude that
the information had not been treated with sufficient care to provide a
reasonable expectation of privacy.42
ited Aug. 30, 1999) <http'//www.cis.ohio-state.edu/htbin/rfc/rfc821.html> [herein-
after RFC 821].
41. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (1994).
42. Note that when individuals receive e-mail, the sender's name appears on a list
and the addressee then clicks on the name to "open" the message. The separation
of sender's name and message occurs at the addressee's terminal. The system




While Illinois recognized that a (third party) system administrator
could lawfully read part or all of a confidential message, it concluded
that the opportunity for illegal interception by such system adminis-
trators did not make it unreasonable to expect privacy of the
message. 43 The reference to "illegal interception" is troubling because
the Illinois opinion recognized that a system administrator has a legit-
imate right to monitor messages, and because both the ECPA and case
law recognize that accessing stored messages is not an interception.
A recent attempt to include accessing stored e-mail messages
within the definition of "interception" by likening such messages to
store voice-mail was rejected by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Smith.44 The Smith Court determined that voice mail was governed
by the Stored Communications Act, making it illegal to access a
message while it is stored, whereas e-mail is governed by the Wiretap
Act (ECPA), making access illegal when contemporaneous with trans-
mission, but leaving access while the communication is stored on a
server unregulated by the ECPA prohibitions on interception. In
other words, the Ninth Circuit determined that reading stored e-mail
messages was not, under the applicable law (the ECPA),
"interception."45
If other courts follow the Ninth Circuit, they may conclude that the
Illinois analysis is technically faulty and unpersuasive, and, therefore,
that the conclusion that the use of unencrypted e-mail across the In-
ternet will not compromise confidentiality or risk forfeiture of the
right to assert the attorney-client privilege is unwarranted because of
the absence of a reasonable expectation of privacy.
To summarize, because the technology makes it possible for third
party system administrators to view e-mail legitimately, the tele-
phone analogy may be unreliable. Unlike telephone conversations,
which are ephemeral, e-mail messages create a document. Although
43. See Ill. Ethics Op. 96-10, supra note 4.
44. 155 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998).
45. See Smith, 155 F.3d at 1056. In Smith, the government argued that the retrieval
of stored voice mail was like the retrieval of stored electronic communications,
and, therefore, was governed by the Stored Communications Act, see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2711 (1994), and not the Wiretap Act (formerly 47 U.S.C. § 605, updated
by the ECPA in 1986, but the court used the old name interchangeably). The
Ninth Circuit, in rejecting the government's analogy, made a distinction between
wire communications (phones and voice mail), for which the ECPA specifically
includes the storage of such information in the definition of "interception," see 18
U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994), and electronic communications (transmission of elec-
tronic signals), which does not include storage in the ECPA definition of "inter-
ception." See 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994). The court found that the ECPA
exclusion of storage in the definition of "interception" means that for electronic
communications, interception must be contemporaneous with transmission and
therefore accessing stored e-mail was not "interception." See Smith, 155 F.3d at
1057.
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e-mail messages travel over telephone lines, the technology causes
them to move through a series of computer system e-mail servers,
some of which may belong to entities which are not regulated inter-
state communications service providers, and thus the risk of disclo-
sure is not limited to "tapping" into a particular conversation in
progress. 4 6 Accessing messages delivered to intermediate systems en
route is not "interception" and is not "illegal." Moreover, the ability of
a third party system administrator to access messages on a mail
server is routine and therefore foreseeable. In addition, not all mail
servers are regulated Internet service providers, and whether entities
other than Internet service providers have confidentiality obligations
is uncertain. Even if entities other than Internet service providers
have confidentiality obligations, it is not clear that they are different
from those of United States postal employees, and information on a
postcard placed in the United States Mail may not be regarded as hav-
ing been treated as confidential information for purposes of, for exam-
ple, discovery demands.
A recent resolution by the ABA House of Delegates calling upon
courts to afford e-mail communications the same reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as a telephone call 4 7 may or may not overcome the in-
fluence of a 1986 suggestion of the ABA Standing Committee on
Lawyers' Responsibility for Client Protection that lawyers should not
discuss confidential matters via e-mail unless they are assured "either
through bar approval or through the lawyer's own informed evalua-
tion" that a system operator will maintain confidentiality.48 Because
46. In this sense, e-mail seems like voice mail, which can be accessed and "read" at a
later time. As indicated above, courts may treat e-mail and voice mail differently.
To the extent voice mail tapes are retained, not erased immediately after being
retrieved, they may also create a "document" which is preserved and retrievable
at a later time. Thus, establishment and maintenance of corporate policies re-
garding the retention and destruction of voice mail tapes is also advisable.
47. See Conference Report, [14 Current Reports] LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 392, 394 (Aug. 19, 1998); see also ABA Formal Op. 99-413 (Mar. 10,
1999) in [Manual] LAWs. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 1101:181.
48. See STANDING CoTSa. ON LAwYERS RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLIENT PROTECTION, ABA,
LAWYERS ON LNE: EmICAL PERSPECTIVES m THE USE OF TELECOMPUTER COhMIU-
NICATiON 67 (1986), noted in [Manual] LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/
BNA) 55:409; see also STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROF. RESPONSIBzrrY,
ABA, RECENT ETmCs OPINIONS, Formal Op. 95-398 (Oct. 27, 1995) [hereinafter
RECENT OPINIONS 95-398]. The formal opinion noted that under Rule 5.3, an at-
torney who gives a third party computer maintenance company access to client
files "must make reasonable efforts to ensure... that the service provider has in
place, or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality of [cli-
ent] information...." RECENT OPINIONS 95-398, supra, at 2. Reasonable efforts
were seen to include attorney oversight to make sure the provider understands
the obligations of maintaining confidentiality, and the Committee further recom-
mended that the attorney obtain written assurance of confidentiality from the
service provider. See id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.4(b) (dealing with an attorney's obligation to advise a client on all matters nec-
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there is no way for a lawyer to evaluate whether the system adminis-
trators of third party systems through which a message may pass will
maintain confidentiality, the Standing Committee's suggestion may
also be seen as supporting a court's finding that in particular circum-
stances, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in connection
with an e-mail message.
Risk #2: A court will apply the U.S. Mail analogy, regard unen-
crypted e-mail sent across the Internet as analogous to sending infor-
mation on a postcard, and conclude that information sent unencrypted
across the Internet is not being handled as if it were confidential.
The South Carolina ethics opinion recognized that "the same po-
tential exists for the illegal interception of regular mail, the intercep-
tion of a facsimile, and the unauthorized wiretapping of a land-based
telephone" and concluded, "[b]ecause the expectation is no less reason-
able than the expectation of privacy associated with regular mail, fac-
simile transmissions, or land-based telephone calls.., use of e-mail is
proper under Rule 1.6."4 9 South Carolina did not discuss the efficacy
of the use of confidentiality language on a facsimile cover sheet or the
distinction between mailing information on a postcard and placing the
message in an envelope, but did warn, "a finding of confidentiality and
privilege... should not end the analysis.... [For] information that a
prudent attorney would be hesitant to discuss by facsimile, telephone,
or regular [(presumably in a sealed envelope)] mail . . . [a] lawyer
should discuss with a client such options as encryption in order to
safeguard against even inadvertent disclosure . . . when using e-
mail."50
As indicated above, asserting the attorney-chent and work-product
privileges requires handling the materials sought to be protected as
confidential. There is a considerable body of literature, both technical
and in the popular press, describing e-mail as "like a postcard."5 1
There is, therefore, a risk that a court will accept the postcard anal-
ogy, and conclude that sending unencrypted e-mail across the Internet
indicates that the information so sent is not being treated as confiden-
tial. If that is a court's position, it is a short step to the conclusion that
essary to make an informed decision about the representation). The ABA Com-
mittee noted that if a breach of confidentiality occurs within the service provider's
company, and the breach could be seen as a "significant factor" with regard to the
representation, disclosure of the breach to the client might be required under
Rule 1.4(b). RECENT OPINIONS 95-398, supra, at 3. The opinion's reasoning also
extends to other third party service providers, e.g., data processing and printing
providers. See id. at 2.
49. S.C. Ethics Op. 97-08, supra note 30; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1998) (duty of confidentiality).
50. S.C. Ethics Op. 97-08, supra note 30; accord N.D. Ethics Op. 97-09, supra note 30;
Vermont Ethics Op. 97-5, supra note 30.
51. See discussion in Freivogel, supra note 7, at 18.
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sending unencrypted e-mail across the Internet waives the attorney-
client and work-product privileges because assertion of these privi-
leges requires handling the information as confidential.5 2
Risk #3: A court will apply the cellular telephone analogy, and con-
clude that when e-mail is sent across the Internet, it will be regarded
as having a reasonable expectation of privacy only if it is encrypted.
There are a number of cases involving communications by cellular
or cordless telephone. This mode of communication has been deemed
similar to e-mail because of the transmission of communications into
an "environment" in which messages can be intercepted relatively eas-
ily, and may even be inadvertently overheard.53 In general, the older
cases involving cellular telephones (which use a broadcast technology,
which is different from the technology employed on the Internet) held
that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in such communi-
cations because of the likelihood of interception. More recently, how-
ever, cellular telephone technology has improved. Encryption is
automatic in certain equipment, and there is at least one case sug-
gesting that with improved technology (by implication, scrambling, a
kind of encryption), there may be a reasonable expectation of
privacy.54
The propriety of using cellular telephones to communicate confi-
dential information with clients has been the subject of several state
ethics committee opinions. New Hampshire sees technology as key in
analyzing whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy with
regard to the use of cellular telephones and other forms of mobile com-
munications. 55 The annotation to its Ethics Committee Opinion on
the subject states: "A lawyer may not discuss client confidences or
other information regarding representation with the client or a third
52. Such a position might have implications beyond waiver of the attorney-client and
work-product privileges. For example, the conclusion that sending unencrypted
e-mail across the Internet fails to treat it as confidential might have implications
for handling information an organization wishes to protect as a trade secret.
53. To the extent statutes have made interception of cellular telephone communica-
tion illegal, it may be argued that these cases are less useful as precedents than
when such statutes do not exist, on the theory that such statutes are comparable
to the ECPA.
54. See, e.g., Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1989); see also People v.
Fata, 559 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990); State v. Delaurier, 488 A.2d 688
(R.I. 1985); State v. Smith, 438 N.W.2d 571 (Wis. 1989). But cf United States v.
Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5 h Cir. 1992); State v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn.
1993) (suppressing cordless telephone conversation). None of these discussions
deals with the possible impact of the location of the speakers (e.g., taxi, commuter
train, street or baseball game) when using their cellular telephones.
55. See New Hampshire Bar Ass'n, Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 1991-92/6 (April 16,
1992) (Confidentiality of Mobile Communications) [hereinafter N.H. Ethics Op.];
accord North Carolina State Bar Ass'n, Op. RPC 215 (1995) (Modern Communi-
cations Technology and the Duty of Confidentiality).
1999]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
party on a cellular or other mobile telephone without the client's in-
formed consent, unless a scrambler-descrambler or similar device is
used."56
Arizona took an approach to cellular telephone communication
that is consistent with its approach to e-mail confidentiality,
concluding:
[T]he time has not yet come when a lawyer's mere use of a cellular phone to
communicate with the client - without resort to a scrambling device or excul-
patory language at the call's beginning - constitutes an ethical breach.
... Nevertheless, there is a genuine risk that a third party may intercept
harmful information. Consequently, the lawyer should exercise caution when
discussing client matters with opposing counsel on any portable telephone. 5 7
By contrast, in Illinois, the state bar association opined, "[miobile
communications are not secure as to maintaining confidentiality of
conversations and participants in those conversations have no right to
expect to maintain privacy of their conversation."5 8 As noted above,
however, Illinois did not follow this reasoning in analyzing e-mail
communication.
Risk #4: A court will look to an organization's internal e-mail policies
regarding e-mail, and make determinations regarding reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy, as well as meeting the standards set forth in
Upjohn,59 based on the organization's written policies and internal
practices and procedures.
E-mail moving within an organization generally moves from the
sender to a central server to the addressee. Messages on the central
server will be accessible to the organization's system administrator,
but this accessibility should not affect the availability of either the at-
torney-client or work-product privileges. The system administrator is
acting as an agent of the sender or receiver, and if examination of e-
mail is required in order to manage the system, such an administrator
probably has a "need to know" that would fall within the protection of
Upjohn.6O Problems may, however, arise in an organization in which
e-mail is "automatically" sent to an entire department or other desig-
nated group of people, some of whom do not have a "need to know"
and, therefore, do not fall within the protection of Upjohn. Theoreti-
cally, the risk is no different from the risk of sending out paper
56. N.H. Ethics Op. in [1991-95 Ethics Opinions] LAWs. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
(ABA/BNA) 1001:5703 (annotation).
57. Arizona State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on the Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 95-11
(1995).
58. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 90-7 (1990)
(citing ILLINOIs RULE OF PROFEsSIONAL CONDUCT 1.6(a)); see also Tyler v. Berodt,
877 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1989); Edwards v. Bardwell, 632 F. Supp. 584 (M.D. La.
1986), af'd, 808 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1986).
59. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-95 (1984).
60. See id.
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("hard") copies to people who have no need to know, but the mechanics
of electronic communication make broad distribution easier, and thus
increase the likelihood of inappropriately broad distribution.
Additional risks arise in connection with retention and destruction
of copies of electronic communications. In most organizations, back-
ups are made automatically, at least weekly, and often daily. If the
backup copies are available to all, without regard to or any effort to
protect their confidentiality, it may be difficult to argue persuasively
that the information is treated as confidential information.
Technology has made new types of review possible and these can
create additional challenges. For example, many companies routinely
scan their e-mail files for inappropriate or improper messages. These
scans can range from a brokerage firm's scanning to assure that its
brokers are not promoting stocks improperly (by searching for key
phrases such as "guaranteed return") to corporations concerned about
employee relations scanning for "steamy" messages. The scanning
process itself is automatic. A simple scan "kicks out" messages which
include the triggering key words or phrases, and then those messages
are reviewed by human beings. To the extent that communications
between attorney and client are reviewed by persons who do not have
a need to know, the attorney-client and related work-product privi-
leges may be at risk. Where messages to or from lawyers are reviewed
by non-lawyers, an argument that the confidential nature of the com-
munications is not being maintained might be successful. These risks
may be considerably reduced by instituting appropriate internal pro-
cedures and internal structures: for example, by making the reviewer
an agent of the organization's lawyer. In the absence of attention to
possible pitfalls, however, the combination of scanning e-mail and re-
view by a person who was neither an attorney nor an agent of an at-
torney, might result in inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client
privilege.61
Arrangements that permit people to work from home or while they
travel by giving off-site persons the ability to access an organization's
intranet computer system from outside that system create additional
challenges to maintaining confidentiality. System security is only as
good as its weakest link. Security of internal systems can be en-
hanced in a variety of ways. For example, many internal systems "au-
tomatically" encrypt e-mail messages and include password protection
mechanisms for each user. Such systems may provide high barriers to
61. In a corporate organization, the ethical issues of disclosure of confidential materi-
als may be less urgent, but practical business issues, such as improper disclosure
of inside information relating to or having an impact on the price of the com-
pany's securities, or inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets, may create business-




casual access and the monitoring of messages, without authorized
users being aware of the barriers.
Finally, an organization's stated treatment of e-mail communica-
tions may influence a court's determination of whether such commumi-
cations are confidential, as well as how confidential they in fact are for
purposes of keeping information limited to persons to have a need to
know. For example, many corporations advise their employees that e-
mall is not confidential, that it is to be used only for corporate busi-
ness, and that it will be monitored. If such corporate policies are in-
cluded in a manual or other written notices instructing employees
that e-mail should not be used to communicate confidential informa-
tion, it may be difficult for the corporation's lawyers to argue that use
of such systems carries a reasonable expectation of privacy and, there-
fore, that it is acceptable to use such systems to communicate attor-
ney-client privileged information. At least, the argument is weak in
the absence of encryption, password, or other types of protection, or
special internal rules regarding which communications are monitored
and who handles such monitoring.
Risk #5: A court or ethics committee will determine that sending
unencrypted e-mail across the Internet does not meet the ethical stan-
dards required of a lawyer to protect client confidences, and find mal-
practice based on such communication.
It is possible that a court or ethics committee would determine that
sending unencrypted e-mail across the Internet does not meet the eth-
ical standards required of a lawyer to protect client confidences, and
find malpractice based on such communication, although such a con-
clusion seems unlikely and unwarranted. Still, given the availability
of encryption software and the relative ease with which it can be used
to protect e-mail communication, it is not inconceivable that a court
would find, under egregious factual circumstances, that the failure to
use encryption was deserving of ethical sanctions.
Risk #6: A client will determine that the lawyer's failure to consider
the risks of using e-mail, explain them to the client, and obtain the
client's consent to using that means of communication is a basis for
terminating the attorney-client relationship.
Outside of states which require, under their ethical rules, that a
lawyer obtain a client's consent to use of e-mail,6 2 there is no ethical
62. See, e.g., Iowa Ethics Op. 96-01, supra note 3; Iowa Ethics Op. 97-01, supra note
3. Missouri also takes the position that lawyers have an obligation to obtain cli-
ents' permission before using e-mail for confidential communications, after the
attorney is satisfied that the client is aware of the risks of interception of the
message as it travels through the Internet as well as through any network to
which the computer may be connected. See Missouri Chief Disciplinary Counsel,
Informal Op. 970230 (undated) in [Manual] LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT
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obligation to discuss the issue, much less obtain client's consent to use
of e-mail. Moreover, a client's agreement to a lawyer's unethical be-
havior does not make such behavior acceptable.
Nevertheless, when inadvertent disclosure of the content of an
electronic communication creates serious problems for the client, if the
lawyer has not discussed the risks of using unencrypted e-mail for
confidential communications, the client is likely to blame the lawyer,
thus impairing or ending an attorney-client relationship. Therefore,
even when neither a legal nor an ethical duty is breached by the use of
e-mail, if confidential information is prematurely disclosed, or inad-
vertently disclosed to a hostile party, the client may be lost.
IX. RECOMMENDATIONS: REDUCING THE RISKS
Recommendation #1: Take the time to understand and evaluate
your organization's e-mail system, advise system administrators of
their confidentiality obligations, and establish and implement appro-
priate internal procedures to protect and evidence confidential han-
dling of confidential information and material.
Because "e-mail" encompasses a variety of communications sys-
tems, in a variety of settings, each with opportunities for a variety of
configurations, what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy in
any given situation depends upon the characteristics of the particular
system involved, where it is, and how it is configured and used. All
systems have system administrators, and those system administra-
tors who are part of an organization's internal system can and should
be advised of their obligations of confidentiality.6 3 To the extent that
they are required or requested to report certain types of information
which comes into their possession through the e-mail systems they ad-
(ABAIBNA) 1101:5244 (annotation). Again, note that if the Ninth Circuit reason-
ing is followed, "interception" is separate from review by a third party system
administrator. The author believes it is appropriate to emphasize that lawful
review by third party system administrators is not interception, is not illegal, and
may occur when messages are sent across the Internet.
63. Neither Arizona, Iowa, Illinois nor South Carolina opinions discuss whether ac-
tual or potential access to confidential information by system administrators
would forfeit the attorney-client privilege because confidential information could
be or had been disclosed to system administrators who constituted persons other
than those with a "need to know." It seems clear that internal system adminis-
trators are like secretaries, i.e., agents with a need to know. It is more difficult to
apply that rationale to third party system administrators, particularly if they are
not administrators of commercial systems. They may have a need to look, but
they do not, for the most part, need to know the contents of messages they review,
and they may or may not have knowledge of the confidential nature of the con-
tents of e-mail messages they review. As indicated above, encryption includes
only text, not address, and indicates the length, but not the content, of a message.
Thus, if the mere fact that two parties are communicating is confidential, encryp-
tion will not disguise that fact.
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minister, if the information is from or directed to a lawyer, protection
of the attorney-client and work-product privileges can be supported by
having the information reported to an attorney. This evidences that
the reporting person is acting as the attorney's agent, and not the
agent of a non-attorney whose review might jeopardize the attorney-
client privilege.
Group distribution arrangements should be instituted with care
and reviewed regularly to assure that confidential communications
are sent to an appropriately limited group. The risk of including inap-
propriate copy recipients of e-mail communications is, theoretically,
no different from that for paper-based communications, but because of
the ease of sending electronic communications and the often auto-
matic setting for dissemination, special care must be taken to assure
that electronic communications of materials sought to be protected
based on their confidential nature (attorney-client and work-product
privileges, and also information such as trade secret materials) are
disseminated in accordance with the desired treatment. Thus, extra
steps may be required in connection with electronic communications
to assure that limited access and evidence of obligations of confidenti-
ality are imposed on corporate personnel. These extra steps can pro-
vide clear and convincing evidence of an intention to protect
confidentiality, thereby enabling the assertion of the attorney-client
and work-product privileges, as well as meeting in-house attorneys'
ethical obligations of confidentiality.
As stated above, a system's security is only as good as its weakest
link. Accordingly, precautions not required within a system may be
appropriate when communicating from outside. Establishing and im-
plementing appropriate security measures to assure that access to the
system is limited to authorized persons provides evidence of concern
with confidentiality and indicates that reasonable steps have been
taken to maintain it.
Procedures and policies should be written, disseminated, and im-
plemented. These procedures and policies should be drafted with a
view to how they will be used by the organization to support its posi-
tion that it handles confidential information as such, and reviewed
with a view of how it might be used by an opponent to establish the
contrary. The policies should not only be written, but implemented,
and should include policies relating to handling of backup copies to
assure that if they contain confidential information, they, as well as
the primary copies, are handled appropriately.
When an outside law firm and a client communicate frequently and
communication includes long documents which are privileged and con-
fidential, it may be advisable to establish a direct, modem to modem,
line of communication with the client. In any event, it is advisable for
the lawyer to investigate the client's e-mail policies and systems, and
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consider treating e-mail communications with that client as the client
itself treats them. If that alternative does not produce a satisfactory
result, other arrangements, which will permit both parties to enjoy
the convenience of electronic communications without sacrificing con-
fidentiality, should be explored. These alternatives include, in addi-
tion to establishing a direct modem-to-modem connection, setting up a
"secure socket" connection, 64 or using the same service provider and
establishing a "private area" within that service to avoid the alterna-
tive of having communications move across the Internet and using
encryption.
Recommendation #2: Recognize that when sending unencrypted e-
mail, there is a risk of disclosure to system administrators, evaluate
that risk, and take additional steps to guard confidentiality when that
risk is deemed unacceptable.
Because of the manner in which e-mail is sent and received, there
is an unavoidable risk of actual disclosure to system administrators.
Whether or not these system administrators have confidentiality obli-
gations, the risk of actual disclosure exists. Thus, where information
is sufficiently sensitive to make actual disclosure unacceptable even if
the persons to whom it may be disclosed have legal or moral obliga-
tions to maintain its confidentiality, additional steps are advisable to
assure confidentiality. Such steps may include encryption, or modified
e-mail arrangements, such as a modem to modem or secure socket
connection.6 5
Recommendation #3: Check local statues, rules of court relating to
evidence and ethics, and local ethics committee opinions regarding use
of e-mail to communicate confidential information, and establish and
institute practices and procedures in light of those rules and opinions.
Lawyers practicing in states in which local laws, decisions or ethics
opinions impose requirements (for example, a requirement to discuss
the use of electronic communication with clients and to obtain consent
to its use)66 will want to be aware of and comply with such require-
ments. Lawyers practicing in states in which local law, decisions and
64. A "secure socket" connection is a special type of Internet connection that auto-
matically encrypts data en route between the two pre-established end points.
Considerable technical expertise is required to make such a connection available,
but once it is available, it is relatively easy to use.
65. This problem cannot be solved by having a dedicated password protected area
within a single commercial system, as the system administrator of that system
will still have the ability, and possibly the need, to review messages. There is,
however, case law to the effect that for Fourth Amendment (search and seizure)
purposes, persons sending messages within a single system have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. See United States v. Maxwell, 42 M.J. 568 (U.S.A.F.
Crim. App. 1995), rev'd in part on other grounds, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
66. See supra note 62.
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ethics opinions do not speak to the issues of whether and when the use
of electronic exchanges of information are appropriate will want to ex-
amine the issues and risks, and make an educated evaluation as to
whether or not the use of e-mail in particular circumstances is, first,
ethical, and even if it is, whether, in the particular circumstances, it is
wise. Lawyers practicing in states in which local law, decisions or eth-
ics opinions have taken the position that use of e-mail is ethical67 will
want to be aware that both the law and relevant technology are in the
process of development and, therefore, also evaluate whether, in the
particular circumstances, use of unencrypted e-mail across the In-
ternet is wise.
Recommendation #4: Discuss use of e-mail with each client with
whom e-mail is expected to be used for attorney-client communica-
tions, or sending work-product or other confidential communications.
The risks of having an unhappy client as a result of using e-mail
can be reduced by conferring with that client regarding the specific
risks of e-mail communication in light of the specific technology being
used, and with due attention to related facts such as the client's inter-
nal system and characterization of its system (if any). Such discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages of a particular mode of commu-
nication may also decrease the risk of being sued by that client for
malpractice if the mode of mutually approved communication turns
out to be less confidential than anticipated. Note, however, that
although the risks of facing a malpractice suit and having an unhappy
client can be reduced by discussing the relative risks and rewards of
using e-mail communication, unless local rules provide otherwise, the
ultimate responsibility for evaluating, for purposes of the rules of eth-
ics, what modes of communication are ethical, remains with the
lawyer.
X. CONCLUSION
The author believes that use of unencrypted e-mail between attor-
ney and client should not, in and of itself, result in a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege for purposes of the rules of evidence. She rec-
ognizes, however, there is a risk that in the absence of legislative gui-
dance,68 a court might decide under certain circumstances that
communication via unencrypted e-mail constitutes a waiver of the at-
torney-client privilege for failure to treat information as confidential.
In the absence of specific rules, counsel is well advised to consider the
67. See, e.g., supra note 3; D.C. Bar Op. 281 (1998); Kentucky Bar Ass'n, Ethics
Comm., Op. E-403 (1998) in [Manual] LAws. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/
BNA) 1101:3903 (annotation).
68. See supra note 2.
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possible risks, weigh them against the benefits, and proceed on the
basis of that evaluation.
The conflicting views regarding e-mail confidentiality impact not
only evidentiary issues, but also, the broader ethical issues as to
whether communicating by e-mail may be deemed to constitute a
breach of an attorney's obligation to protect client confidences.
Whereas failure to guard confidential information adequately is pun-
ishable, in the context of litigation, by making the information avail-
able for discovery, failure to guard client confidences in breach of the
lawyer's ethical obligations may result in that lawyer being sued for
malpractice, and in egregious cases, having the lawyer's license to
practice law suspended or revoked. Even the less drastic (and perhaps
more likely) response of an unhappy client taking its business else-
where when it believes its confidential information has been treated
inappropriately can have devastating adverse effects on the lawyer's
reputation and financial condition.
There is no doubt that e-mail provides a rapid, efficient, inexpen-
sive, and, therefore, a highly desirable mode of communication. Possi-
bly, the advantages of unencrypted e-mail communication, in all its
forms, so far outweigh the risks of inadvertent disclosure that except
in states whose ethics rules or opinions provide otherwise, a general
conclusion that use of unencrypted e-mail is ethical is warranted. On
the other hand, state ethics opinions differ, the rationales of some of
these opinions may be based on erroneous or changing interpretations
of the law, technology is fluid and evolving in ways which may impact
reasonable expectations of confidentiality, and e-mail policies of the
parties involved may have an impact on what expectations are reason-
able in particular circumstances. Thus, lawyers are well-advised to
consider the use of e-mail carefully, including the additional security
and evidentiary value of encryption and modem-to-modem or secure
socket communication, and to balance the inconvenience of making
special arrangements with the advantages of the additional comfort
they may provide.
Whatever the decision at a given point in time, so long as both law
and technology remain subject to constant and rapid change, it will be
appropriate to revisit the decision periodically to assure that past
evaluations have not become outdated because their underlying ratio-
nales have become inaccurate, or no longer apply because the law or
technology have changed. In short, so long as use of e-mail for confi-
dential communication remains an issue on which reasonable people
differ, regular review of practices and procedures to assure they re-
main in conformity with current legal, ethical and technical realities
is appropriate.
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